new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 8d3be0285f1d4667bfe85dba555c663eb3d704b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?=EC=8B=A0=EC=9C=A4=EC=A0=9C=28=ED=95=99=EB=B6=80=EC=83=9D-?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=EC=86=8C=ED=94=84=ED=8A=B8=EC=9B=A8=EC=96=B4=EC=A0=84=EA=B3=B5?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=29?= <ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr>
+Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 10:48:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] dnsproxy: Address CVE-2025-32366 vulnerability
+
+In Connman parse_rr in dnsproxy.c has a memcpy length
+that depends on an RR RDLENGTH value (i.e., *rdlen=ntohs(rr->rdlen)
+and memcpy(response+offset,*end,*rdlen)). Here, rdlen may be larger
+than the amount of remaining packet data in the current state of
+parsing. As a result, values of stack memory locations may be sent
+over the network in a response.
+
+This patch adds a check to ensure that (*end + *rdlen) does not exceed
+the valid range. If the condition is violated, the function returns
+-EINVAL.
+
+Signed-off-by: Dario Binacchi <dario.binacchi@amarulasolutions.com>
+Upstream: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=8d3be0285f1d4667bfe85dba555c663eb3d704b4
+---
+ src/dnsproxy.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/dnsproxy.c b/src/dnsproxy.c
+index 7ee26d9ff886..1dd2f7f5d47e 100644
+--- a/src/dnsproxy.c
++++ b/src/dnsproxy.c
+@@ -998,6 +998,9 @@ static int parse_rr(const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *start,
+ if ((offset + *rdlen) > *response_size)
+ return -ENOBUFS;
+
++ if ((*end + *rdlen) > max)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ memcpy(response + offset, *end, *rdlen);
+
+ *end += *rdlen;
+--
+2.43.0
+
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ CONNMAN_CPE_ID_VENDOR = intel
# 0001-dnsproxy-Fix-NULL-empty-lookup-causing-potential-cra.patch
CONNMAN_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-32743
+# 0002-dnsproxy-Address-CVE-2025-32366-vulnerability.patch
+CONNMAN_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-32366
+
CONNMAN_CONF_OPTS = --with-dbusconfdir=/etc
ifeq ($(BR2_INIT_SYSTEMD),y)
In ConnMan through 1.44, parse_rr in dnsproxy.c has a memcpy length that depends on an RR RDLENGTH value (i.e., *rdlen=ntohs(rr->rdlen) and memcpy(response+offset,*end,*rdlen)). Here, rdlen may be larger than the amount of remaining packet data in the current state of parsing. As a result, values of stack memory locations may be sent over the network in a response. Fixes: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-32366 Signed-off-by: Dario Binacchi <dario.binacchi@amarulasolutions.com> --- ...Address-CVE-2025-32366-vulnerability.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++ package/connman/connman.mk | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/connman/0002-dnsproxy-Address-CVE-2025-32366-vulnerability.patch